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Until the early 1970s, third world policy makers received 
clear guidance from economists: the production (or purchase) 
of more guns must come at the sacrifice of butter. This all 
changed with the 1973 publication of Emile Benoit's seminal 
work1• Benoit's analysis was the first quantitative assessment 
of the manner in which third world defense expenditures 
affect overall rates of economic growth. Needless to say, his 
counter-intuitive finding that defense expenditures do not 
necessarily hinder or help growth stimulated a deluge of 
critical, follow on papers.2 
Concurrent analysis by Charles Wolf/' however, suggested 
that in certain situations, particularly those present in the 
newly industrializing countries of South East Asia, defense 
expenditures, through creating a more stable economic 
environment, stimulated rates of investment, technological 
progress, technology transfer and hence increased overall 
growth. 
In contrast, much of the quantitative research in the early 
1980s - largely undertaken in England by Saadat Deger4 and 
associates and using large samples of developing countries -
brought the debate full circle, through lending considerable 
1. Emile Benoit, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass: 
Lexington Books, 1973). 
2. For an excellent summary and assessment of this literature Cf. Steve Chan "Milit.ary 
Expenditures and Economic Performance," in United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Trans/en (Washington: 
ACDA, 1987), pp. 29-38. 
3. Charles Wolf, "Economic Success, Stability and the 'Old' International Order," 
International Security (1981), pp. 75-92. 
4. See in particular Saadat Deger, Military Expenditures in Third World Countries: The 
Economic Effects (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). 
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support to the conventional wisdom that increased defense 
expenditures retard growth. Here, it is important to note that 
the magnitude of these effects was so small as to suggest that 
only marginal increases in growth could be obtained through 
disarmament and or restraint in expanding defense expendi-
tures. 
Given these somewhat contradictory findings it is little 
wonder that third world policy makers continue to increase or 
decrease defense expenditures for reasons largely unrelated to 
potential economic gains or losses. This is somewhat in 
contrast to the situation in developing countries where 
increasing evidence exists that military expenditures, 
particularly in those countries with an indigenous arms 
industry, have been used by several governments as a form of 
"Military Keynesianism" to stabilize domestic economic 
performance.11 
Should the state of research on third world military 
expenditures lead third world policy makers (and aid donors) 
to abdicate responsibility for advising either increased or de-
creased military expenditures on purely non-strategic grounds? 
We submit that more recent quantitative evidence on third 
world military expenditure has largely reconciled previous 
contradictory findings, thus permitting fairly unambiguous 
guidelines as to the likely economic consequences of increased 
defense expenditures in less developed countries. 
Resent Research on the Defense-Growth Controversy 
Subsequent to Deger's efforts, research in the United States 
has focused on various topologies of developing countries.6 
5. As for example in the case of Canada as documented inJohn Treddnick, ''The Arms 
Race and Military Kcynesianism," Canadian Public Policy (1985), pp. 77-92. See also 
Robert E. Looney, "Military Keynesianism in the Third World: An Assessment of Non: 
Military Motivations for Arms Production," Journal of Polilical and Military Sociology 
(Spring 1989), pp. 43-64. 
6. The rationale for this approach is given in P.C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney, 
"Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries," Armed Forces 
and Society (Summer, 1983), pp. 633-646; P.C. Frederiksen and Robert E. Looney, 
"Another Look at the Defense Spending and Development Hypothesis," Defense Analysis 
(September 1985), pp. 205-210; and Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, "Defense 
Expenditures, External Public Debt and Growth in Developing Countries," journal of 
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The philosophy underlying this approach implicitly assumes 
that the ramifications of defense expenditures will be largely 
conditioned not by their dollar amount, or share of GNP per 
se, but instead by the economic environment in which they are 
undertaken. Similarly it is assumed that third world economic 
environments vary sufficiently to warrant classifying countries 
into two or more relatively economically homogenous sub-
groupings for purpose of analysis. 
Also implicit in this research is the underlying assumption 
that defense expenditures make both positive and negative 
contributions to economic growth. The positive impacts stem 
from the factors originally observed by Wolf- technological 
spin-offs, Keynesian type demand linkages to sectors operating 
at excess capacity, and the transference of skills acquired in the 
military to civilian activities. Negative impacts are related to 
the opportunity cost of resources pre-empted from the private 
sector. 
The methodology largely follows the structuralist macro-
economics approach to development pioneered by Hollis 
Chenery.7 More specifically this approach implicitly assumes 
along linear programming type lines that growth in develop-
ing countries is constrained by various resource limitations -
most often foreign exchange or domestic savings. It follows 
that given the relative differences between countries as to the 
extent to which resources are binding, defense expenditures 
should have a varied impact depending upon the resource 
endowments of the countries in which they are l!ndertaken. 
This appears to be precisely the case.8 Significant differen-
ces between developing countries (Table 1) were found with 
regard to a wide spectrum of resource indices. In countries 
where foreign exchange and ·or savings are relatively abun-
Peace Research (December 1986), pp. 197-211. 
7. Hollis Chenery and A. Strout, "Foreign Assistance and Economic Development," The 
American Economic Review (September 1966), pp. 679-733: and H. Chenery, "The 
Structuralist Approach to Economic Development," The American Economic Review (May 
1975). 
8. Cf. the studies cited in note # 6. Country grouping based on resource constraint are 
listed in Table 2. 
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dant, its opportunity cost in terms of lost non-military output 
appears to be low enough so that empirically the positive 
impacts derived from increased military expenditures have 
tended to predominate.9 The opposite was found for countries 
experiencing relatively severe shortages of foreign exchange 
and or domestic savings. 
Table 1 
Comparisons of Constrained and Unconstrained 
Developing Countries 
(means) Constrained Unconstrained 
Group Group 
Gross Inflow of Public 0.94 0.26 
Loans/Exports, 1982 
External Public Debt, 1982 2629.30 11786.90 
International Reserves, 1982 583.80 6138.80 
External Public Debt/GDP, 1982 44.30 19.20 
Growth in Imports, 1970-82 1.09 9.50 
Debt Service/Exports, 1982 15.00 12.50 
External Public Debt/GDP, 1982 21.20 10.40 
Growth in Public 7.40 8.70 
Sector Consumption, 1970-82 
Public Consumption %GDP, 1982 1.8.10 15.70 
Private Consumption %GDP, 1982 70.00 62.20 
Government Expenditures %GDP, 1981 26.90 25.40 
Government Expenditures %GDP, 1972 20.50 19.50 
Gross Investment %GDP, 1982 18.00 26.30 
Government Surplus - 6.20 - 2.90 
(deficit) %GDP, 1981 
Government Revenue% GNP, 1981 19.90 22.90 
Public Borrowing 1.20 0.31 
Commitments %Exports, 1982 
9. Perhaps, however at the expense of a deteriorating distribution of income. Cf. Robert 
Looney, "Impact of Arms Production on Third World Distribution and Growth," 
Economic Development and CuUural Change (October 1989), pp. 145-54 . 
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Public Borrowing 6.88 0.04 
Commitments %GDP, 1982 
Debt Service % Exports, 1982 15.00 12.50 
Debt Service % GDP, 1982 4.10 2.90 
Gross Inflow Public 5.74 0.04 
Loans/GDP, 1982 
Gross Inflow Public 0.94 0.26 
Loans/Exports, 1982 
Net Inflow Public 0.70 0.15 
Loans/Exports, 1982 
Total Government Revenue 
% GDP, 1972 16.80 19.40 
Growth in GDP, 1970-82 5.60 3.70 
Increase in Public External 23.10 8.80 
Debt to GNP, 1970-82 
Military Expenditures % GNP, 1981 3.60 5.10 
Military Expenditure 57.70 223.30 
per capita, 1981 
Sources: Economic Data World Bank, World Development Reporl, various years (New 
York: Oxford University Press). Military Expendilure Dala: World Military Expendilures and 
Anns Transfers, various issues (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disanna-
ment Agency. 
Extending this analysis to the determinants of defense 
expenditures, it is again apparent that third world countries 
are not homogenous with regard to the factors affecting arms 
imports, overall military expenditures. Again it appears that 
access to foreign exchange is the common thread in accounting 
for fundamental differences with regard to both the produc-
tion 10 and importation of arms. 11 In fact there is an overlap 
between the resource unconstrained countries and those with 
a domestic arms industry12 (Table 2). A similar overlap exists 
10. Robert E. Looney and P.C.Frederiben, "Profiles of Latin American Miliary 
Producers," lnlemational Organization (1986), pp. 745-752. 
11. Robert E. Looney, "Economic Factors Affecting the Third World Arms Trade," 
/nlemational Trade journal (Summer 1988), pp. 377-408. 
12. As defined in Stephanie Neuman, "International Stratification in Third World 
Military Industries," /nUrna.lional Organization (Winter 1984), pp. 167-198. Arms 
• 
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between countries that are constrained and those that do not 
have an indigenous arms industry. As one might expect, many 
of the same structural contrasts characterizing resource con-
strained and unconstrained countries also apply to the arms 
producers/non-producers13 (Table 3). 
Recent research14 also indicates15 that it is possible that a 
large group of relatively debt free (debt as a percentage of 
GDP) resource unconstrained countries have contained arms 
imports within the limits imposed by their self-financing rather 
than risk jeopardizing their overall credit-worthiness. On the 
other hand it is possible that a large proportion of the debt 
accumulated by the resource constrained group of less devel-
oped countries (LDCs) has stemmed from military expendi-
tures. Apparently, the perceived need to expand defense 
expenditure by this group in the face of foreign exchange 
shortages has resulted in relatively high levels of external 
indebtedness measured either as a percentage of exports or 
GNP. 
Budgetary analysis16 indicates that the constrained coun-
tries have increased military expenditures largely at the 
expense of economic allocations. Non-constrained countries 
show no apparent tradeoff between defense and economic 
producers are defined by her as those countries producing at least one major weapons 
system. 
13. Robert E. Looney "Economic Environments Conducive to Indigenous Tilird World 
Arms Production," The Singapore Economic Review (October 1988), pp. 63-78. 
14. See Robert Looney, "Impact of Military Expenditures on third World Debt," 
Canadian journal of Development Studies (1987); and Robert E. Looney, "The Influence 
of Arms Imports on Tilird World Debt," journal of Developing Areas (January, 1989), pp. 
221-232. 
15. This research produced nearly identical findings for arms producer and non-
producing countries as was found or the resource constrained and unconstrained 
countries. Cf. Robert E. Looney "Socio-Economic Environments and the Budgetary 
Allocation Process in Developing Countries: The Case of Defense Expenditures," Socio-
Economic Planning Sciences (1988), pp. 71-82. 
16. Robert E. Looney, "Military Expenditures in Latin America: Budgetary Analysis," 
journal of Economic Development (1986); Robert E. Looney, "Budgetary Impacts ofTilird 
World Arms Production," International journal of Public Administration ( 1988), pp. 601-
623; and Robert E. Looney, "Financial Constraints of Potential Latin American Arms 
Producers," Current Research on Peace and Violence (1987), pp. 159-68. 
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expenditures. 
The results obtained from time series, country specific 
studies17 have provided further insights into this process: 
1. It appears that negative impacts stemming from increased 
defense expenditures are not so much a function of increases 
in the share in GDP (as assumed in the cross sectional studies), 
but instead, are the result of short term surges. 
2. The impact of increased allocations to defense tends to 
vary significantly from sector to sector (agriculture, industry, 
investment), being positive in some instances and negative in 
others (during the same time interval). 
Table 2 
Country Sample 
Arms Producers Non-Producers 
Israel c Nicaragua c Panama c 
India u Cameroon c Uruguay c 
Nigeria u Tanzania c Uganda c 
Indonesia u Sudan c CAR c 
Egypt u Costa Rica c Ghana c 
S. Korea u Bolivia c Burma c 
Singapore u Senegal c Jamaica c 
Venezuela u Somalia c Trinidad c 
Mexico u Togo c Papua c 
Brazil u Tunisia c Zimbabwe c 
Philippines u Buru~di c Honduras c 
Ecuador c Guatemala c Kenya c 
Colombia u Malawi c N. Yemen c 
17. Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, "Economic DeterminantsofLatinAmerican 
Defense Expenditures, Armed Forces and Society (Spring 1988). pp.459-471; Robert E. 
Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, "The Economic Determinants of Military Expenditures 
in Selected East Asian Countries," CoriUmporary Southeast Asia (forthcoming, 1990); 
Robert E. Looney "'!be Role of Military Expenditures in Pre-Revolutionary Iran," 
Iranian Studies (1988), pp. 52-83; and Robert E. Looney "Impact of Defense Expendi-
tures on the Saudi Arabian Economy," journal of Arab Affairs (Fall 1987), pp. 198-229. 
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Thailand u Niger c Jordan u 
Malaysia u El Salvador c Liberia c 
Peru c Paraguay c Algeria u 
Chile c Haiti c Ivory 





DataSoun:es: Economic data was taken from the World Banlt, World Development Report, 
New York: Oxford University Press, various issues. Military expenditure data was taken 
from the United States Arms Contrpl and Disarmament Agency, World Military E~i­
tures (Washington: United States Government Printing Office), various issues. The 
classification of countries as arms and non-arms producers is from: Stephanie Neuman, 
"International Stratification in Third World Military Industries," l11Umational 
Organization (Wmter 1984), pp. 167-198. 
u = resource unconstrained; c = resource constrained 
Table 3 
Structural, Performance and Defense 





EXTERNAI/BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 




Growth in imports 1960-70 
Growth in imports 1970-80 
Growth in exports 1960-70 
Growth in exports 1970-80 
Current account balance 
EXTERNAL DEBT 
Outstanding external debt 1,987 
Debt as share of GDP 
External borrowing commitmen 
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FISCAUSA VIN GS (%GDP) 
Average national savings 20.7 15.2 
Average marginal savings 19.5 8.6 
Government consumption 16.7 14.5 
Gross domestic investment 14.8 17.3 
COMPOSITION OF GDP 
Share of agriculture 18.5 29.4 
Share of Manufacturing 18.1 10.2 
Share of Exports 32.8 24.9 
DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
Military expenditures 1,597.9 936.7 
Armed forces 220.3 68.3 
ME share of GNP 4.1 5.5 
ME per capita 110.5 147.2 
PERFORMANCE VARIABLES 
Export instability ( 1 96 7 /71 ) 8.6 10.8 
Growth GDP, 1960-70 5.8 5.4 
Growth GDP, 1970-80 5.2 3.7 
Gross international Reserves 476.3 122.6 
Per capita income 1,749.6 1,795.0 
SIZE VARIABLES 
Area 1,280.2 502.8 
Gross Domestic Product 47,835.9 9,529.8 
Population 67.9 10.9 
Note: Unless otherwise specified, figures are average values for the 1970-80 period. 
3. The impact of defense expenditures on the economy 
appears to also be closely related to the budgetary priority 
process. Increases in defense financed by reductions in social 
expenditures and or domestic borrowing tend to impact 
positively on the economy. In contrast increased defense 
financed by reductions in economic expenditures or increased 
external borrowing tend to impact negatively on the 
economy.18 
In short, the research summarized above demonstrates a 
consistent pattern whereby a specific group of some twenty 
Third World states - generally the more successful economi-
18. Robert E. Looney, "Austerity and Military Expenditures in Developing Countries: 
The Case of Venezuela," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences (1986), pp. 161-165. 
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cally, and/or those with the greatest access to foreign exchange 
(either through exports and or capital inflows) - produce arms 
and at the same time derive positive impacts from military 
spending. A larger group of some forty countries less successful 
economically, or with limited access for foreign exchange do 
not produce arms and, in addition fail to derive any positive 
economic impacts from defense expenditures. These countries 
experience lower growth and higher external debt burdens 
following an expansion in defense expenditures. 
Implications for Public Policy 
The studies summarized above suggest the importance of 
economic variables in affecting the impact of defense expendi-
tures, and their method of financing. The fact that a much 
larger group of countries experiences negative impacts from 
increased defense expenditures (as opposed to a smaller group 
that obtains positive benefits) explains why weak negative 
impacts are found when both sets of countries are analyzed as 
a combined group. However, because Deger's studies indicated 
only marginal gains to growth from reduced allocations to 
defense, her findings were thought to have little relevance for 
public policy. 
The major implication of the empirical work summarized 
here is that it may be more feasible than previously thought to 
develop models for predicting and monitoring the various 
aspects of third world economic performance as they pertain 
to changes in military expenditures. For example, because the 
more recent analyses suggest fairly significant increases in 
growth associated with reduced levels of military expenditures 
in resource constrained countries, these studies suggest ways to 
improve the United States Agency for International 
Development's reporting to the Congress on implementation 
of Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act. In this report, 
Al.D. must identify recipient countries which have exceeded 
a comparative norm for military expenditures and advise 
whether each such country should be ruled out for four kinds 
of U.S. assistance as a result of Section 620 considerations. 
Similarly, and perhaps because of the lack of strong 
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empirical evidence as to the detrimental economic effects 
associated with defense expenditures, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has been somewhat reluctant to set 
limits to military expenditures as part of its standard stabiliza-
tion program for problem borrowers. The findings sum-
marized above suggest that reduced military expenditures 
would not only increase growth in these countries, but perhaps 
more importantly would facilitate increased economic activities 
while freeing up foreign exchange for debt servicing. The 
IMF's programs while often ineffective in the past, might be 
considerably strengthened if credit linked to targets in military 
spending were made an integral part of its policy on 
conditional lending. 
On the other hand, it is not completely apparent what if any 
public policy prescriptions are implied for the set of less 
resource constrained countries obtaining positive benefits from 
defense expenditures. Is there an optimal level of defense 
expenditure after which additional expenditures exhibit falling 
productivity in contributing to growth? Clearly the rate of 
return on defense expenditures is positive for these countries, 
but is it higher than for alternative forms of public expendi-
tures? Considerably more in depth country studies will have to 
be undertaken before this issue can be resolved. 
